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A B S T R A C T
Strategic niche management and transition management have been promoted as useful avenues to pursue in
order to achieve both speciﬁc product or process changes and system transformation by focusing on technology
development through evolutionary and co-evolutionary processes, guided by government and relevant stake-
holders. However, these processes are acknowledged to require decades to achieve their intended changes, a
timeframe that is too long to adequately address many of the environmental and social issues many in-
dustrialized and industrializing nations are facing. An approach that involves incumbents and does not consider
targets that look beyond reasonably foreseeable technology is likely to advance a model where incumbents evolve
rather than being replaced or displaced. On the other hand, approaches that focus on creating new entrants could
nurture niche development or deployment of disruptive technologies, but those technologies may only be
marginally better than the technologies they replace. Either approach may take a long time to achieve their
goals. Sustainable development requires both radical disruptive technological and institutional changes, the
latter including stringent regulation, the integration of disparate goals, and changes in incentives to enable new
voices to contribute to new systems and solutions. This paper outlines options for a strong governmental role in
setting future sustainability goals and the pathways for achieving them.
1. Introduction
This paper traces the strengths and weaknesses of the evolutionary/
co-evolutionary processes of transition management (TM) and strategic
niche management (SNM) in achieving sustainable development. These
approaches mirror ecological modernization (EM) in their focus on
learning processes within the ﬁrm and among ﬁrms in an evolving
technological regime that hope to change and accelerate innovation
processes in order to achieve more sustainable technologies (Ashford,
2002a). Their early proponents rejected revolutionary and disruptive
changes brought on by government ﬁat, i.e., by regulation (Rotmans
et al., 2001), although, curiously, in still earlier work some of them
acknowledged the potential of regulation to change technological tra-
jectories dramatically (Schot et al., 1994). Later proponents do argue
that a dual policy approach focused on the destabilization of incum-
bents (echoing a belief in Schumpeterian waves of creative destruction)
and the creation and development of new niches are required (Kivimaa
and Kern (2016); Grin et al. (2010). However advances in achieving
sustainable development may be slow and marginal in nature.
This paper argues that regulation-induced technological innovation
has a much greater potential in making the signiﬁcant changes required
to achieving sustainable development by encouraging radical rather
than incremental disrupting innovation, especially from new entrants
displacing incumbents (Ashford and Hall, 2011). The new entrants who
develop radical disrupting innovations are not niches waiting “in the
wings” to develop/evolve further their technologies and eventually
displace potentially competitive incumbents, but are more likely to be
entirely new ﬁrms (such as TESLA) or ﬁrms not previously doing
business in the area (such as DowSilicone ﬂuid replacing Monsanto's
PCBs in transformers and capacitors). TM and SNM processes are ar-
gued to be “too little, too late.” Nowhere is this more evident than in
the area of global climate disruption. Progress that is too little and too
late has been made internationally through evolutionary processes. It is
time to embark on a diﬀerent pathway. Stringent regulation has the
potential to encourage discontinuous and radical, rather than incre-
mental evolutionary change (Ashford et al., 1985; Ashford and Hall,
2011). Even with stringent regulation, regulatory capture in theory can
be as serious a problem as the capture of TM by the incumbents as
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occurred in the energy sector in the Netherlands (Smith, 2003; Smith
and Kern, 2007), but the literature reveals that regulation-induced in-
novation is likely to result in more siginﬁcant change than advances
made through TM and SNM.
Unsustainable systems, such as energy production and use, agri-
culture, and transportation consist of inter-connected components and
economic actors characterized by technical (and political) “lock-in”
which is diﬃcult to change. We are convinced that strategic stringent
regulation of those components, if conceived in an integrated fashion,
would be a more successful pathway to sustainability, even if greeted by
political resistance.
In this paper, we address the theories of system innovation (Section
2), the strengths and weaknesses of the TM and SNM approaches
(Section 3), the argument in favor of a stronger role for government
than mere guidance (Section 4), regulation-induced technological in-
novation as a more viable alternative than TM and SNM for achieving
more sustainable development (Section 5), and ﬁnally conclude with a
discussion of the importance of diﬀusion (as opposed to innovation) in
achieving sustainable development (Section 6).
2. The Innovation Process: Distinguishing Singular Product and
Process Changes From Systemic Innovation
Much faith and hope in transforming industrial systems has been
placed on the concept of innovation. After all, the root of the word
implies change. The innovation process is acknowledged to encompass
three related and interactively-connected activities: invention, innova-
tion, and diﬀusion. Invention is the ﬁrst working prototype of a tech-
nology; it can involve a product, a process, or a manufacturing/service
system. Innovation is the ﬁrst or new market application, while diﬀu-
sion refers to proliferation of the innovation throughout an industry.
When the innovation is then used in other industries, applications, or
national contexts, we often also use the term technology transfer to
describe diﬀusion. Finally, if signiﬁcant adaptation is required in a new
context, it is sometimes referred to as a separate innovation (for a full
discussion of innovation see Ashford and Hall, 2018, Chapter 6).
While governments, as well as the private sector, generally devote
signiﬁcant resources to create innovations, especially in saleable pro-
ducts although process innovations also receive attention, it is im-
portant for our purposes to distinguish what motivates a particular
innovation and who provides the ﬁnancial capital to spur both in-
novation and diﬀusion (Ashford and Renda, 2016, p. 36).
Innovation may be driven by technology-push or market-pull forces
(see Fig. 1) (Ashford and Renda, 2016, p. 36). Industrial sectors routi-
nely engage in the R&D necessary to develop saleable technologies with
the hope that the market will absorb them, even in the absence of
nascent market demand. This occurs naturally (as an evolutionary
process) and can take decades. Traditional industrial policy that pro-
vides government assistance is often said to “grease the wheels of in-
novation” in hopes of the nation enjoying ﬁnancial rewards (see the
discussion below).
The role of the government in promoting innovation is presented in
Fig. 2, indicating all the traditional ways in which innovation might be
stimulated (Ashford and Hall, 2011).
The interventions depicted in the ﬁgure are of course familiar to
those involved with traditional industrial (or perhaps more accurately,
innovation) policy that focuses on singular product or process changes.
System innovations, discussed below, such as the transportation system
or the agricultural system necessarily involve multiple economic actors
interacting in larger venues and this model does not adequately re-
present the complexity involved in system transformations.
Technology-push innovations are pursued by proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms and
by countries seeking to enhance domestic and trade revenues.
In contrast, there are often nascent or express market needs de-
manding to be satisﬁed. Market-pull innovations can also be pioneered
(Jänicke and Jacob, 2005) by ﬁrms recognizing an unmet societal or
market need and direct their innovative eﬀorts towards that end. Often
the demand is diﬃcult to assess and can wane over time. An example is
the need for a better chemotherapeutic approach to cancer, or increased
concern for ﬁnding a cure for Alzheimer's disease. Often, the R&D need
is cutting-edge and ﬁnancially risky. Government often supports the
initial forays into research that is considered too risky by the private
sector as exempliﬁed by the development of computers, aircraft, and
the Internet (Mazzucato et al., 2015).
When it comes to stimulating innovation (and diﬀusion) of system
transformations – and as we argue in this article – there seems little
doubt that government setting of speciﬁc medium- to long-term man-
datory targets, plus economic support, are essential for achieving
transformations within a reasonable period of time (Ashford et al.,
1985; Pelkmans and Renda, 2014). For a discussion of targets in the
context of evolutionary and co-evolutionary pathways, see Section 4 of
this paper. Regulation and mandated targets essentially collectivize
public demand or needs through the setting of standards and require-
ments (Ashford et al., 1985). Costs are imposed on the private sector
with cost-sharing achieved through business and R&D deductions.
Sometimes direct subsidies are provided. Governments need to under-
stand the diﬀerent forces giving rise to innovation and diﬀusion, and
not succumb to traditional industrial policy if serious transformations –
especially involving the displacement of incumbents or system changes
involving many diﬀerent economic actors – is what is needed. For a
further discussion of industrial policies, see Andreoni (2017), Norman
and Stiglitz (2017), and Stiglitz et al. (2013). For a discussion of targets
in the context of evolutionary and co-evolutionary pathways, see
Section 4 of this paper.
In the last decade, the concept of co-evolutionary innovation has
been introduced by Dutch researchers injecting government and sta-
keholder guidance in the selection process entailing strategic niche
management and transition management (Grin et al., 2010). This co-
evolutionary process is advocated for system innovation, but its pro-
moters admit the transformations can also take decades to achieve.
Technology Push
Market Pull (Demand Pull)
Research & 
Development
Production Marketing Need?
Research & 
Development
Production Marketing
New Regulation
or Expressed 
Market Need
Fig. 1. Technology push vs. market pull innovation.
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We certainly believe that system transformations are key to
achieving systemic change involving technological, organizational, in-
stitutional, and societal innovations among a disparate collection of
economic actors, but a much more directive role for government to
meet the challenges is needed through an integrated approach utilizing
a policy mix of regulations, mandatory targets, and appropriate eco-
nomic signals (see for example, Rogge et al., 2017; Grubb et al., 2017;
and Kivimaa and Kern, 2016). The government must take on the role of
trustee for the needed transformations – and trustee of the technologies
and ﬁrms of the future, often not yet represented at the negotiation
table – not of referee, teacher, or generator of consensus.
Finally, one of the bottlenecks in commercialization of useful
technologies may come late in the innovation cycle. The innovation
literature emphasizes the importance of deployment – the step in which
a technology moves from bench-top or lab to actual commercial use in
practice. Semantic preferences diﬀer as to whether this is described as
the last step in the innovation activity or the ﬁrst step in diﬀusion.
Semantics aside, what is important is that the R&D to accomplish this
transition is not basic research, but truly applied research, a distinction
glossed over in discussions of innovation policy. Barriers to deployment
are often inﬂuenced by incumbents whose technologies compete with
the new technology and seek to delay or prevent its entry. SNM and TM
scholars are certainly correct that niches of outsiders could theoretically
deploy the needed technologies that otherwise cannot penetrate the
market to the beneﬁt of society. The strategic question is whether SNM
and TM approaches are the best way forward.
2.1. Theories of System Innovation
When we move beyond product and process innovation into system
changes, in addition to the wide range of instruments that can be used
to guide technological development (in the product and process con-
texts), there are a number of theories that describe the process of
technological innovation. Box 1 shows how the various schools of
economic, historical, and sociological thought diﬀer in their approaches
to conceptualizing technological development. In each description, the
role of government is identiﬁed. Whether technologies from these ni-
ches go far enough in a particular context is an important question.
Ashford and Renda (2016) have argued that rather than an innovation
deﬁcit, achieving serious reductions in GHG emissions suﬀer from a
“diﬀusion” or “deployment deﬁcit”. These authors argue that stringent
mandatory targets are needed.
The theories of technological innovation shown in Box 1 provide an
indication why focusing on government intervention in the process of
technological innovation is important, even necessary. In addition, al-
though the policy instruments above have been listed in a general form,
we should recognize that the success of a particular instrument in di-
recting or stimulating technological development is context sensitive
(Wallace, 1995).
Understanding the role of societal (or cultural) change and how new
technology forms can regulate social behavior is essential (Winner,
1977, 1986, 1992). If society is unwilling to accept (or buy) a new
technology, then that technology will not be diﬀused suﬃciently to
aﬀect the overall system (unless it is imposed by regulation).
Asking whether a new technology form is likely to be diﬀused
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Fig. 2. Traditional industrial policy interventions.
Source: Ashford and Hall (2011).
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suﬃciently to aﬀect the overall system is critical for sustainable de-
velopment. In Europe, and more speciﬁcally in the Netherlands, there is
a growing body of research that looks into how society can transition
(that is, transform) to sustainable forms of development through system
innovation (Elzen, 2002; Elzen et al., 2004; Grin et al., 2010; Kemp and
Rotmans, 2005; van Mierlo et al., 2010).
A “transition” (or transformation) is described as “a long-term
change process in an important sub-system encompassing various
functional systems (for example, food production and consumption,
mobility, energy supply and use, etc.) in which both the technical and
the social/cultural dimensions of such systems change drastically”
(Elzen, 2002, p. 1). A “system innovation” is described as “a set of in-
novations combined in order to provide a service in a novel way or
oﬀering new services. System innovations involve a new logic (guiding
principle) and new types of practices” (Rennings et al., 2003, p. 14).
Geels (2004, pp. 19–20) describes a system innovation as consisting of
three important aspects: (1) technological substitution, which includes
the emergence and diﬀusion of new technology that replaces existing
technology; (2) the co-evolution of technological and social systems,
where both types of systems are continually interacting and changing;
and (3) the emergence of new functionalities, where a new product or
service provides a new functional characteristic. It follows that a
“sustainable” system innovation would provide economic, environ-
mental, and social beneﬁts with the oﬀering of new products, processes,
or services.
An important characteristic of research focusing on system in-
novation is the recognition that the relationships among sets of tech-
nologies are dynamic, complex, and nonlinear, and that these tech-
nologies are socially embedded. This focus supports the idea of
dynamic, as opposed to static, eﬃciency and the importance of
considering the fourfold co-evolution of technology, institutions, orga-
nizations, and society. Because the evolutionary economic and quasi-
evolutionary approaches to technological innovation (Box 1) make
technology and innovation explicit and adopt a systems approach, the
frameworks developed to assess system innovation are built on these
theories. Because neoclassical economic theory treats technology as
exogenous, it does not provide fertile ground for considerations of
system innovation.
Brieﬂy, evolutionary economics focuses on the process of techno-
logical innovation from the perspective of the survival of the ﬁttest –
that is, its roots are Darwinian and Schumpeterian (Geels, 2010; Grin
et al., 2010, pp. 35-42). Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982) were the ﬁrst
to develop an economic theory in which the evolutionary theory of
technological innovation was embedded. Their theory is based on two
independent processes: variation and selection. In addition, because
technology is treated as being socially embedded, the ideas of path
dependency or lock-in and bounded rationality play important roles in
the analysis of technological innovation. For a more recent treatment of
lock-in in the context of a carbon economy, including technological,
infrastructural, institutional, and behavioral lock-in see Geels (2014)
and Seto et al. (2016). The evolutionary model of technological in-
novation was later extended by focusing on the sociological aspects of
the evolutionary approach (Rip, 1992; van de Belt and Rip, 1987). The
so-called evolutionary approach treats the variation and selection of
technology as non-independent events (Moors, 2000). Thus, the focus is
on how technological variations are inﬂuenced by the selection en-
vironment.
The ﬁeld of evolutionary economics has emerged as one important
framework for understanding how modern economies work.
Development is conceived as an evolutionary process. In general,
Box 1
Theories of technological innovation and the role of government (Ashford and Hall, 2018, Chapter 8).
Neoclassical economic approach: Technological development is exogenous, and technology is treated as a black box. Using this approach, a
rational actor will attempt to maximize the production function. Government intervention corrects underinvestment by stimulating fun-
damental R&D and supporting universities.
Evolutionary economic approach: Technological development is endogenous and is a path-dependent process of variation and selection.
Technology is described as evolving from a ﬁrm's knowledge base. Technological development tends to occur along known directions,
favoring path dependency and lock-in. The role of the government is to generate variation within an entrepreneurial climate that enhances
innovation.
Systems-of-innovation approach: Technological development is a process of interactive learning and includes not only R&D and
knowledge production but also the transfer, exchange, and use of knowledge and the demand for knowledge. The aim of technological
development is to optimize the use of knowledge generated by a system of related and linked actors. The role of the government is to
maintain the institutional knowledge infrastructure of universities and research institutes.
Industrial-networks approach: Technological development takes place in a process of interactions between actors who perform activities
and have access to diﬀerent resources. Thus, technology (innovation) is the result of interactions between ﬁrms. No explicit attention is
given to directing technological development. The role of the government is to build and renew local knowledge-intensive networks and to
stimulate cooperation.
Social constructivism approaches: Technological development is led by a process of social interaction that is directed by the values and
beliefs of interest groups and actors (including government). The role of the government is to understand and articulate speciﬁc positions
during negotiations and to develop networks that support social interaction.
Quasi-evolutionary approach: Technological development is a process of co-evolution at diﬀerent levels of analysis (micro, meso, and
macro). Hence, technology is an object in a co-evolutionary learning process. The technological regimea guides, but does not ﬁx, R&D
activities. The role of the government is to inﬂuence the rules of a technological regime to facilitate learning processes among the various
actors, and to establish niches of protected learning.
Large-technical-systems approach: Technological development is the process of solving critical problems of a technical (or engineering)
system. Technology is seen as part of an expanding technical system. Critical problems – or reverse salients – of the technical system have to
be solved before the system can expand. The role of the government is to avoid causing or strengthening reverse salients and to reinforce
the capacities or possibilities of system builders.
Sources: Luiten (2001), Moors (2000), and Partidario (2003).
aRip and Kemp (1998, p. 340) deﬁne a technological regime as “the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering
practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons,
ways of deﬁning problems – all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures.”
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evolutionary theory views innovation as a dynamic, interactive process
of variation and selection where institutions and actors continually
inﬂuence and learn from each other.
Within evolutionary theory there are currently two important and
related conceptual frameworks that can be used to develop initiatives to
stimulate system innovation for sustainable transformations. Kemp
(2002), Kemp et al. (2007); Kemp and Rotmans (2005); and Loorbach
and Huﬀenreuter (2013) propose “strategic niche management” and
“transition management” – a quasi-evolutionary approach – for
achieving system changes necessary for sustainability. Ashford and Hall
(2011, 2018) argue for integrating rather than coordinating govern-
ment interventions in order to bring about the needed technological,
organizational, institutional, and social transformations to achieve
signiﬁcant sustainable system change. A role for government is antici-
pated by each group of commentators, but to diﬀerent degrees and in
diﬀerent ways.
3. Strategic Niche Management and Transition Management
The concept of strategic niche management (SNM) emerged from
the two opposing views of the technological ﬁx ideology (or technological
optimism) and the cultural ﬁx paradigm (Hoogma et al., 2002). The
former argues that the beneﬁts associated with technological progress
are likely to far outweigh costs, and that a technological solution can be
found to all problems. The latter suggests that the technology itself is
actually part of the problem and that real solutions will have to come
from social and cultural change. Therefore, SNM was created to “allow
for working on both the technical and the social side in a simultaneous
and coherent manner” (Hoogma et al., 2002, p. 3). The related concept
of transition management (TM) is discussed later in this section. SNM
and TM are only two of several possible theories of sustainable transi-
tions/transformations we have chosen to discuss – see Feola (2015) –
because they have captured the attention of Dutch and EU industrial
policy, especially regarding energy, and because they heavily envision
the involvement of incumbents and would (in our view as explained
more fully later) require too long a time to yield the necessary radical
technological and social changes to be useful. A useful and thorough
treatment of the history of SNM and TM is provided by Loorbach et al.
(2017).
Kemp (2002, p. 10) describes SNM as the “creation and manage-
ment of a niche for an innovation with the aim of promoting processes
of co-evolution.” The idea is that a new product will be used by real
users (by society, industry, or government), and its use will promote
interactive learning and build a product constituency. The underlying
notion is that new technologies will be introduced in a socially em-
bedded manner. It is important to realize that SNM is primarily focused
on product innovation, not process innovation. However, its proponents
argue that process innovation will be part of technological regime
transformations (see the discussion of regime change below). SNM also
enables institutions and organizations to adjust the technological de-
velopment and deployment process to stimulate the adoption and dif-
fusion of a new product.
A key element of the SNM concept is that technological change
occurs in a co-evolutionary manner – that is, technologies evolve within
institutional networks. Saviotti (2005) suggests that two important
general points can be made about the co-evolution of technologies and
institutions: “First, the emergence of new technologies increases the
division of labor in the economy, but in the meantime creates new
coordination problems. One of the roles of co-evolving institutions is to
provide coordination. Second, although the ﬁrms producing and using
the new technologies compete, other co-evolving institutions are in a
complementary relationship with the main technology” (Saviotti, 2005,
p. 30). Saviotti's comments highlight the complexity that surrounds the
introduction of a new technology and provide weight to Kemp's argu-
ments for the creation of protective niches in which promising tech-
nology can be tested and developed. The ability to experiment with new
technology through demonstration projects that help users and sup-
pliers learn about new possibilities is a vital component of SNM.
The process of experimentation is likely to achieve one of two
outcomes: regime optimization or regime shifts. These two outcomes
can be described as sustaining or disrupting changes, respectively. A
technological regime is deﬁned as “the whole complex of scientiﬁc
knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies,
product characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs,
regulatory requirements, institutions and infrastructures” (Hoogma
et al., 2002, p. 19). In general, the type of technologies that are suitable
for experimentation should be ones that hold the potential to bridge the
gap between existing and new (sustainable) technological regimes
(Kemp, 2002). This type of technology is referred to as “pathway
technology.” In essence, SNM is a bottom-up, initially nondisruptive
process where once the niche for experimentation has been established
by government policy, the new technology form evolves from interac-
tions among society, government, nongovernmental organizations, and
industry. The emphasis is on multistakeholder governance rather than
on government as the dominant actor.
Transition management (TM) is a model of co-evolutionary man-
agement of transformative change in societal systems through a process
of searching, learning, and experimenting (Rotmans and Kemp, 2008).1
Managing means adjusting, adapting, and inﬂuencing rather than using
a command-and-control approach. There are persistent problems for
which there are no immediate solutions. By transforming a persistent
problem into a visionary challenge, TM explores a range of possible
options and pathways through carrying out a diversity of small-scale
experiments. Based on what is learned from these, the vision, agenda,
and pathways are adjusted. Successful experiments are continued and
can be scaled up, and failed experiments are abandoned, until con-
vergence is reached. Rather than focusing on a single, available solu-
tion, TM explores various options and is aimed at guiding variation-
selection processes into more sustainable directions, with the long-term
aim of selecting the most sustainable option(s) and paths based on
learning experiences. TM is meant to be a mutually supportive vehicle
for both sociotechnical and policy changes.
It is debatable whether Kemp's description of the latter strategy will
result in disrupting innovation. Kemp (2008, p. 374) acknowledges that
“faced with sustainability problems, [incumbent] regime actors will opt
for change that is non-disruptive from the industry point of view, which
leads them to focus their attention on system improvement instead of
system innovation.” Whether the concept could hold particular merit
for system innovation in a speciﬁc context remains to be seen. If re-
volutionary change – or a technological regime shift – can occur via a
stepwise system innovation process, SNM can be a useful tool that can
be applied to large-scale engineering systems, such as the transporta-
tion system (Hoogma et al., 2002; Hoogma et al., 2001), but that is a big
“if.” It depends on, among other things, the extent to which incumbents
dominate the process. A more optimistic set of scenarios incorporating
disrupting changes for energy transformations is discussed by Wilson
and Tyﬁeld (2018).
1 Kemp (2008, p. 375) comments: “The management of institutions can be done
through the […] use of three coordinating mechanisms: markets, hierarchy, and struc-
ture.” “The basic steering mechanism is modulation, not dictatorship or planning and
control” (Kemp, 2008, p. 377), and “The long-term goals for functional systems are
chosen by society either through the political process or in a more direct way through a
consultative process” (Kemp, 2008). Kemp endorses market-based instruments, and al-
though he does not explicitly mention regulation, it is clear that he rejects regulation as
the main steering approach; this is in line with his commitment to evolutionary ap-
proaches and strong commitment to markets. This parallels the recent contribution of
ecological economists Beddoe et al. (2009, p. 2488), who also ignore regulation as a
mechanism to achieve sustainable transformations and instead rely on cultural evolution
to “push our society towards the adoption of institutions that best ﬁt the new circum-
stances.” “Creating a sustainable future will require an integrated, systems level redesign
of our socio-ecological regime focused explicitly and directly on the goal of sustainable
quality of life rather than the proxy of unlimited material growth” (Beddoe et al., 2009, p.
2483).
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Critics of SNM argue that one of the shortcomings of the technique
is that at some point the “probe and learn” ideology needs to become
action and transformation, and Kemp's theory is unclear on how
transformation will occur (Smith, 2003). Further, if niches grow within
or alongside existing regimes, they are unlikely to have radically dif-
ferent practices and rules, which raises the question whether the new
products, processes, or services will oﬀer signiﬁcant beneﬁts. A ﬁnal
point raised by Smith (2003) is the fact that the localization of niches
may run against the nationalization or globalization ideology of
mainstream government and business institutions. Thus, an important
question is whether the “transformative potential” of SNM will be in-
hibited by these powerful forces (Smith, 2003).
Vergragt (2005) raises a slightly diﬀerent concern from that of
Smith (2003). He argues that if the role of government is to legitimize
the transition process – including its own reform and the abolition of
existing institutional and economic barriers to sustainable development
– then a quandary exists because the national government may in fact
be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Therefore, an
important question is who will manage the transition process. Quist and
Vergragt (2004) also question whether an emerging niche market will
survive once its protection mechanisms are removed. On the other
hand, Grin et al. (2010, p. 83), in stating that “[m]uch of the cited
research focuses on explaining the limited success of the [SNM] ex-
periments studied,” references Hommels et al. (2007, p. 85) who are
described as arguing that “part of the problem might be that SNM fo-
cuses too much on providing protection.”
In critiquing the TM approach, Tukker et al. (2008) comment that
transition management of innovation neglects the role of the consumer
and the importance of demand-side policies inﬂuencing consumption. It
should be noted that regulation is both a supply-side and demand-side
policy intervention; it deﬁnes the allowable characteristics and places
constraints on the nature of products and on their manufacturing, use,
and disposal (Ashford and Hall, 2011, p. 280).
Dewulf et al. (2009), in analyzing transition management in the
context of other theories of change management – especially inter-
vention by government – question whether transition management is
the “only model in town.” Dewulf et al. (2009, p. 12) observe that “a
distinctive trait of transition management appears to be the assumption
of an overarching position of (governmental) transition managers who
can apply management tools, niche-building machinery, and en-
gineering devices from a privileged, knowledgeable and external posi-
tion […] towards a clear and one-dimensional target.” The government
participates along with other stakeholders, rather than taking a more
directive role reminiscent of command-and-control regulatory in-
volvement. The process is characteristically Dutch, using the so-called
“polder consensus-seeking model.” Dewulf et al. (2009, p. 4) argue that
transition management can take a relatively long time – twenty-ﬁve to
ﬁfty years – whereas collaboration theory in practice focuses on
reaching an agreement and eﬀectuating change in a few years' time.
Given the existence of relatively short-term “tipping points” in sus-
tainability challenges, e.g., global climate disruption, endocrine dis-
ruption, and rapidly changing ﬁnancial landscapes, the beneﬁts of
transition management may come far too late. Collaborative processes,
of course, have their own drawbacks.
Recent transition scholarship has directly addressed the acknowl-
edgement that evolutionary or co-evolutionary developments may take
far too long given the challenges presented, particularly in energy and
climate change (Sovacool, 2016; Sovacool and Geels, 2016; Kern and
Rogge, 2016). Kern and Rogge (2016, p. 13) argue “that quicker tran-
sitions have happened in the past and may therefore also be possible in
the future globally.” They oﬀer three main reasons “for the possibility
of low-carbon transitions of the energy system occurring faster than was
the case for historical transitions” (Kern and Rogge, 2016, p. 13). First,
historic energy transitions have not been consciously governed,
whereas today a wide variety of actors is engaged in active attempts to
govern the transition towards low carbon energy systems. Second, and
in addition to the ﬁrst point, international innovation dynamics can
work in favor of speeding up the global low-carbon transition. Finally,
the 2015 Paris agreement demonstrates a global commitment to move
towards a low carbon economy for the ﬁrst time. Of course, the Paris
agreement is a quasi-regulatory, though voluntary, set of commitments
and Ashford and Renda (2016) have argued that we need to heed the
warnings of Jeﬀrey Sachs that picking the long-hanging fruit to meet
those commitments may herald in the wrong kind of technological re-
sponses (Sachs et al., 2015).
Although Kemp acknowledges that regulation can be a useful tool to
stimulate radical (system) changes, his faith in the formation of stra-
tegic niches and stepwise change within the original technology regime
is not likely to result in disrupting forms of technology that are neces-
sary for sustainable development. The problem is that ﬁrms are likely to
resist initiatives or regulations that threaten their market position and
focus instead on activities that maintain the status quo. Thus, a reliance
on evolutionary or even co-evolutionary change rather than revolu-
tionary change is not likely to support the emergence of new market
entrants who play an important role in introducing radically diﬀerent
(and potentially more sustainable) forms of technology (Reinhardt,
1999).
Berkhout et al. (2004) make a case similar to that of Ashford and
Hall (2011). They argue that the tendency of critical social groups to
target the “incumbent regime, rather than its potential successor, […]
represents a direct antithesis of the bottom-up niche-based model”
(Berkhout et al., 2004, p. 61). They continue, “The lesson appears to be
that attempts at normatively-driven sociotechnical transitions (that is
those forms most pertinent to the transition management project) do
not follow exclusively the pattern described by the niche-based model,
but instead imply much greater attention to macro-level processes
(public opinion, government policy, and the structure and scope of
markets) and their capacity to inﬂuence and induce innovation at the
micro- and meso-level. Here the landscape is actively seeking to act on
and inﬂuence the regime, not the other way around” (Berkhout et al.,
2004, pp. 61–62).
Jacob (2005), while generally supportive of decoupling economic
growth from environmental degradation through ecological moder-
nization, raises questions similar to those of Ashford and Berkhout et al.
and asks whether SNM's experimental arena is likely to capture and
maintain the necessary political (and ﬁnancial) support for a real
transition. Further, Jacob (2005) argues that although “discourse and
persuasion” are useful tools, they are unlikely to resolve any opposing
core beliefs held by the actors. Thus, bargaining and making trade-oﬀs
are likely to play an inevitable role in any decision-making and tran-
sition process.
Finally, continuing from Smith's (2003) earlier reservations about
the ability of SNM to bring about the needed transformations, Smith
and Kern (2007) comment on its limited success in energy policy in the
Netherlands. They describe how Kemp and Rotmans persuaded the
Dutch government to adopt SNM as a central strategy in its Fourth
National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP4) in 2001. It should be
noted, however, that the environmental successes of earlier Dutch Na-
tional Environmental Policy Plans (NEPPs) were premised on the gov-
ernment setting clear future targets but negotiating ways of achieving
those targets with stakeholders. The approach later adopted in its NEPP
was to negotiate both targets and pathways with stakeholders. Existing
industrial stakeholders may not represent the interests or capacity of
future technology providers who are likely to displace them.
The NMP4 focuses on restructuring production and consumption
systems over a thirty-year period to achieve a reduction of one-twen-
tieth in both resource and energy use. Some challenged whether such a
change can be achieved through SNM (Smith and Kern, 2007) and TM
(Shove and Walker, 2007). The latter critique stimulated a response by
Rotmans and Kemp (2008) and a counter-response by Shove and
Walker (2008), illustrating just how important the issue of transition
management is becoming in the sustainability debate.
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In spite of initial reservations about the success of TM-inspired re-
incarnation of long-term policy design, some of its critics are cautiously
optimistic about its future use (Shove, 2010; Voss et al., 2009). We,
however, remain skeptical because (1) the time framework for success
is far too long given the challenges of sustainable development, (2)
there is too much potential for capture of future agendas by incum-
bents, even if they change somewhat, and (3) without clear and certain
long-term targets characteristic of backcasting, long-term investments
by new entrants leading to discontinuous change necessary for radical
technological change are unlikely to be made. Backcasting in incre-
mental steps is not long-term backcasting, and while it introduces
ﬂexibility and mid-term corrections, it does not provide certain targets
towards which to innovate. Again, we ﬁnd it diﬃcult to be optimistic
that step-wise changes made towards uncertain futures involving in-
cumbents will lead to radical, disrupting changes. Ecological moder-
nization or reﬂexive governance arose historically because govern-
ments were not willing to exercise courage at setting long-term goals
that challenge incumbent forces and agendas. Second generation policy
design, represented by SNM and TM, operating under the soft eu-
phemism of accommodation and learning has similar serious weak-
nesses.
In an earlier critique of the policy implications of SNM, Grin et al.
(2010, p. 91) oﬀer:
The research discussed indicates that SNM is not a silver-bullet so-
lution that will bring about transitions towards sustainable devel-
opment, if only because experimenting will not be suﬃcient. SNM
should be seen as a useful addition to existing policy instruments
that have neglected the value of experiments. Other more traditional
instruments for inducing sustainable innovation, such as market
incentives, various forms of regulation and technology forcing also
have to play a role.
Grin et al. (2010, p. 84) distinguish the potential eﬀectiveness of TM
and SNM:
we acknowledge that TM addresses some factors that SNM under-
plays. While SNM develops an evolutionary approach that builds on
and leverages the dynamic forces of market competition, aimed at
overcoming lock-in and promoting socio-technical diversity, TM
suggests a more ambitious approach of goal-oriented modulation
that places more emphasis on the role of strategic envisioning. In
that respect, TM introduces the notion of “transition experiment”
which is supposed to be diﬀerent from regular innovation experi-
ments (van den Bosch and Taanman (2006)).
In more recent work, Smith and Raven (2012) oﬀer an extensive
analysis of niches as protected spaces for which the important dynamics
are shielding, nurturing, and empowerment. They distinguish incum-
bents (perhaps dominant incumbents) seeking to continue innovating
on proven technology development (mainstream pathways) from others
seeking more innovative changes, but a distinction is not made between
those “others” who are incumbents and non-incumbents. While a dis-
tinction is made between insiders and outsiders, the implication is that
both seem to be within the incumbent category, and not the distinction
that van de Poel (2000) has made in his work on “outsiders.”
Further, while mainstream selection environments hinder path-
breaking innovations, the fact that some incumbents seek the protection
oﬀered by strategic niche management does not mean the innovations
that come forth are signiﬁcant or suﬃciently disruptive. For a contrary
view, see Wilson and Tyﬁeld (2018). New innovations nurtured by
SNM/TM may take decades to penetrate markets, which may be too
long to meet many of the signiﬁcant challenges to sustainability. Smith
(2017) comments that “strategic dilemmas confront more radical, path-
breaking innovators [… N]iche spaces […] to develop alternatives and
to explore what kinds of new institutions are needed for the innovation
to ﬂourish are an important ingredient, and have the potential to link
with other forms of transformational agency, such as social movements
or progressive business and investment.”
Addressing the possibility that innovation in the context of energy
might be stimulated by the “grassroots” in the UK, Smith et al. (2016, p.
412) observe that “all grassroots developments soon encounter im-
pediments arising from social structures inherent to regimes” and “[i]t
is the spread of critical insight, and transformative politics, that be-
comes the indicator of success.” These observations are in line with our
own which are circumspect about the suﬃciency of “bottom-up” ap-
proaches to chart adequate pathways to sustainable development, ex-
cept perhaps in the local or regional context – see Hansen and Coenen
(2015) on this point.
A potentially signiﬁcant barrier to transformative change is poli-
tical. Transition processes tend to be “inherently political, and as en-
compassing, long-term processes of multiple changes in socio-technical
systems, they require broad understandings of the political” including
the notion of intended capture in system transition, the role of dis-
ruptors, path dependency, and incumbents (Avelino et al., 2016 p.
563). For a further discussion of regime resistance, disruption by out-
siders, and the political challenge of governance, see Geels (2014),
Kungl (2015), Markard et al. (2016), Meadowcroft (2009, 2011),
Stirling (2014), and Voss et al. (2009). See also, Avelino (2017) who
analyzes power and empowerment in the context of sustainability
transitions and transition governance.
Many scholars acknowledge the importance and diﬃculties of in-
cumbents in fostering transitions towards sustainability (for a com-
prehensive treatment see Johnstone and Newell, 2018 and Turnheim
et al., 2015). Relying on a deep review of the literature, Smink (2015)
in particular explores the many ways in which incumbents guide and
inﬂuence government policies and put new entrants at a disadvantage,
including what amounts to regulatory capture. There is precious little
discussion of the role that stringent regulation can play to “make a
market for innovation” (Ashford et al., 1985), where what is being
demanded cannot easily be satisﬁed or developed by the incumbents'
technology and requires radical (i.e., disrupting) innovation which is
less likely to come from the incumbents than outsiders or new entrants.
This omission demonstrates a blind spot on the part of scholars who see
change as coming not from government technology-forcing, but via
predominantly evolutionary or co-evolutionary pathways. Stringent
regulation can turn the tide towards the advantage of outsiders
(Ashford et al., 1985; Ashford and Hall, 2011). Modest regulation gives
incumbents the advantage.
Johnstone and Newell (2018, p. 1) comment that the role of the
state (government) is underdeveloped in the transition management
literature and “the range and depth of powers that only the state can
call upon will be required if radical and rapid transitions are to be
achieved” in order that economic systems operate within planetary
boundaries. Referencing, among others Mazzucato (2015), Aiginger
(2014), and Stiglitz et al. (2013), the authors emphasize the importance
of government beyond nurturing niches in inﬂuencing industrial policy.
They observe that “it has been recognized for some time that there has
been an overemphasis on niche development, and that accelerated
transitions will have to tackle the dynamics which sustain the stability
of unsustainable social-technical systems” and that “regime stability
[…] slows the pace of [the needed] transitions […] through the stra-
tegies of incumbents” (Johnstone and Newell, 2018, p. 3). They con-
clude “the state in varying ways plays a variety of roles in sustainability
transitions, both acting as an enabler and a barrier to transformations to
sustainability” (Johnstone and Newell, 2018, p. 9), depending on whose
interests the state serves.
4. A Stronger Role for Government
Government has an important role to play in creating winning
forces and visions for sustainable transformations. Depending on the
type of transformation required, the roles of government should en-
compass the following (Ashford, 2002b, pp. 18–19):
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• The direct support of R&D and incentives for innovation through
appropriate tax treatment of investment;
• the creation and dissemination of knowledge through experi-
mentation and demonstration projects;
• the creation of markets through government purchasing;
• the removal of perverse incentives of regulations in some instances
and the deliberate design and use of regulation to stimulate change
in others;
• the training of owners, workers, and entrepreneurs, and educating
consumers; and
• the direct creation of meaningful, rewarding, and satisfying jobs.
It should be clear how these roles relate to the ideas embedded in
SNM and TM approaches, but we envision a much stronger role for
government in stimulating technological innovation.
Much has been written about “policy mixes” addressing both tech-
nology-push and market/demand-pull strategies. They involve research
and development undertaken by the government itself (Mazzucato
et al., 2015), government funding of research and development at
universities and research institutions, economic or market instruments,
and regulatory standards to harmonize industrial practices. They are
generally focused on greasing the industrial development process, ra-
ther than stimulating radical technology that falls under the rubric of
“technology-forcing.”
A review of papers on policy mixes is provided by Rogge et al.
(2017), who draw conclusions from analyzing ﬁfteen papers with dif-
ferent analytical perspectives based on a range of social science dis-
ciplines, such as environmental economics, innovation studies, and
policy sciences. These papers present a diﬀerent understanding of
policy mixes, and oﬀer a list of key deﬁnitions of policy mix compo-
nents: policy instruments, policy design features, instrument interac-
tions, policy strategy, policy process, and consistency, coherence, or
credibility.
Notable articles (all focusing on energy) provide the following in-
sights on the role policy and regulation can play in inducing innova-
tion2:
• Cantner et al. (2016, p. 1165): “policies and environmental reg-
ulations are important drivers [for both development and diﬀusion]
in environmental technologies especially, in renewable energies;”
• Costantini et al. (2017, p. 799): “a variety of factors drive eco-in-
novation, but also highlight the primary role played by public po-
licies (environmental regulation, energy and technology policies)
that are increasingly used to foster the rate of introduction and
diﬀusion of new environmental technologies to meet sustainable
development goals” and “strict regulations on vehicle emissions in
the US spurred innovation in foreign countries such as Germany and
Japan” (Costantini et al., 2017, p. 801);
• Grubb et al. (2017, p. 25): “many big energy sector investments are
in sectors (like electricity), which if not directly conducted by state
entities, are nevertheless strongly inﬂuenced by the rules and reg-
ulations that shape the market structure and related terms of in-
vestment;” and
• Jacobsson et al. (2017, p. 18): “the Commission's focus on market
failures, static eﬃciency and technology neutrality does not cover
all possible obstacles and leads it to neglect the centrality of dy-
namic eﬃciency and the structural build-up of innovation systems
around new technologies.” The paper scrutinizes “the analytical
base of the EU Commission, contrast[s] it with the work of classical
economists and recent innovation scholars, and draw[s] lessons for
how eﬀective mixes of policy instruments may be identiﬁed.”
Government should go beyond simply creating a favorable invest-
ment climate. “Without deliberate design, signiﬁcant changes – even
system changes – are unlikely to improve competitiveness, environ-
ment, and employment at the same time” (Ashford, 2002b, p. 18). As
discussed in the next section, stringent regulation (focusing on environ-
mental, health, and safety issues) is essential to stimulate signiﬁcant
technological changes, and such regulation may in fact be necessary to
create niches that facilitate the entry of new ﬁrms and organizations
into a new market.
Others who support the view that stringent regulation is necessary
for environmental innovation include Foxon et al. (2004); Huber
(2004b); Jänicke (1990); Pelkmans and Renda (2014); Botta and
Koźluk (2014); and Ghisetti and Pontoni (2015). For instance, Huber
(2004a, p. 447) comments that “strict environmental performance
standards [… remain] by far the most eﬀective controls instrument for
environment and innovation alike (which is not astonishing given the
fact that environmental standards are, or immediately translate into,
technical standards).” Perhaps what is astonishing is the largely absent
mention of government regulation in the early SNM and TM literature.
See Pelkmans and Renda (2014) for a recent review of the stimulating
eﬀects of regulation on innovation. In later scholarship, regulation
appears to be increasingly addressed – see Geels et al. (2016),
Hoppmann et al. (2014), Markard et al. (2012), Normann (2017),
Quitzow (2015), Smith et al. (2005), and Smith and Raven (2012). It is
mentioned as one of four interventions in later literature focused on a
dual policy focus on destabilizing incumbents and creating new niches
in Kivimaa and Kern (2016, p. 215).
Ashford et al. (1985) have long argued that an evolutionary (or in-
cremental) pathway is insuﬃcient to achieve factor ten or greater im-
provement in a system's performance. Further, because changes in so-
ciotechnical systems (such as the transportation or energy system) are
diﬃcult, the "creative use of government intervention is a more pro-
mising strategic approach" for achieving sustainable industrial trans-
formations than the reliance on the more neo-liberal policies relying on
ﬁrms' more short-term economic self-interest” (Ashford, 2002b, p. 10).
Hence, relying on Christensen's (1997) approach to radical disrupting
innovation is seen as being unlikely to result in “system” transitions
towards sustainable development; however, disrupting forms of tech-
nological change are likely to continue.
In addition, Ashford (2002b, p. 19) states that governments should
work with stakeholders to deﬁne future targets – while ensuring that
their agendas are not captured by incumbent ﬁrms – and then use their
position as trustee to “represent the future generations and the future
technologies to ‘backcast’ what speciﬁc policies are necessary to pro-
duce the required technical, organizational, and social transforma-
tions.” (Ashford, 2002b)3 More recent work on the importance of tar-
gets includes: Johnstone et al. (2010) on Kyoto targets; Schmidt et al.
(2012) on 2020 climate targets; Reichardt et al. (2016) on technology-
speciﬁc renewables targets; and Nemet et al. (2014) on the credibility of
energy policy targets. See also Loorbach et al. (2017).
Sixteen years after Ashford's (2002b) assertion, we contiue to be-
lieve that it is likely that an evolutionary pathway is insuﬃcient to
achieve factor ten or greater improvements in eco- and energy eﬃ-
ciency and reductions in the production and use of, and exposure to,
toxic substances. Such improvements require more systemic, multi-
dimensional, and disruptive changes. We have already asserted that the
capacity to change can be the limiting factor, and that this is often a
crucial missing factor in optimistic scenarios.
Successful management of disruptive product innovation requires
initiatives and input from outsiders to produce the expansion of the
design space that limits the dominant technology ﬁrms. Especially in
2 See also Johnstone et al. (2017), Kern et al. (2017), Kivimaa et al. (2017), and
Kivimaa and Kern (2016).
3 The backcasting approach enables policy makers to look back from a desirable future
to create strategies that they hope will enable the future visions to materialize. This ap-
proach is in contrast to current planning processes that develop strategies based on
forecasts.
N.A. Ashford, R.P. Hall Ecological Economics 152 (2018) 246–259
253
sectors with an important public or collective involvement, like trans-
portation, construction, and agriculture, this means that new govern-
ment-led approaches are required to bring about necessary change.
Rigid industries whose processes have remained stagnant also face
considerable diﬃculties in becoming signiﬁcantly more sustainable.
Shifts from products to product-services rely on changes in the use,
location, and ownership of products in which mature product manu-
facturers may participate, but this requires signiﬁcant changes invol-
ving both managerial and social (customer) innovations. Changes in
sociotechnical systems, such as transportation or agriculture, are even
more diﬃcult. This is why the creative use of government intervention
to stimulate the needed changes may be critical.
This is not to say that enhanced analytic and technical capabilities
on the part of ﬁrms and cooperative eﬀorts and improved commu-
nication with suppliers, customers, workers, other industries, and en-
vironmental/consumer/community groups are not valuable adjuncts in
the transformation process. But in most cases, these means and strate-
gies are unlikely to be suﬃcient by themselves for signiﬁcant trans-
formations, and they will not work without clear mandated targets to
enhance the triple goals of competitiveness, environmental quality, and
enhancement of employment/labor concerns.
Government has a signiﬁcant role to play, but the government
cannot simply serve as a referee or arbiter of existing competing in-
terests, because neither future generations nor future technologies are
adequately represented by the existing stakeholders. And new stake-
holders are only marginally likely to be brought into development by
incumbents, notwithstanding the wishful thinking of SNM and TM ad-
vocates.
Government should work with stakeholders to deﬁne far-future
targets, but without allowing the incumbents to capture the agenda. It
has to go beyond its historical focus on coordinating public- and pri-
vate-sector policies. It must be multidimensional and directly address
the present fragmentation of governmental functions. This means that
the various policies must be mutually reinforcing and the targets must
be clear.
In a recent report intended for the EU Commission by Ashford and
Renda (2016), the authors address the likelihood of the EU achieving
deep de-carbonization by pursuing traditional industrial policy. They
argue that the key is in properly designed and executed regulation.
Beyond energy and climate change challenges, Loorbach and
Huﬀenreuter (2013) address the economic crisis and explore whether
TM might contribute to mitigating or overcoming its eﬀects. They
provide a lucid analysis of the origin of the crises, the contribution of
incumbents to perpetuating an economic development model that is
“broken” and focused on GDP-led growth (resulting in systemic lock-
in), and question whether “going green” is suﬃcient to address the
needed development reforms because being dependent on GDP is not a
“fundamental systemic solution.” The authors focus on currencies, re-
sources, and governance, and they argue for a combined “bottom-up”
and “top-down” approach, which they term ‘glocal governance’ that
aims to avoid economic growth that results in unequal distribution of
resources and increased levels of ecological damage. Also see Loorbach
et al. (2017) on the importance of setting targets to escape lock-in in the
context of incumbent transformations through transition management
in order to stimulate radical innovation. Here, although lock-in is ex-
plicitly recognized as a problem, speciﬁc policies are lacking. The au-
thors state that “although technologies might play an important role in
understanding transitional change, the emphasis is rather on how in-
cumbent routines, powers, interests, discourses, and regulations create
path dependencies and how these are challenged by (transformative)
social innovations” (Loorbach et al., 2017, p. 610). In other words,
regulations are mentioned in the context of their creating lock-in, but
not their use in breaking lock-in. Yet the authors comment (Loorbach
et al., 2017, p. 600):
It has been only over the past decade or so that real progress is being
made with the diﬀusion of renewable technologies. It coincides with
increasing disruptions in markets for oil and gas, sharp declines in
the use of coal, and struggling fossil energy companies. The current
dynamics are only partly driven by incumbent actors and are heavily
inﬂuenced by “outsiders” to the fossil energy system such as co-
operatives and cities; companies such as Tesla, Siemens, Ikea, and
Google; and social movements such as the divestment movement
and the LINGO (“Leave It in the Ground”) campaign. The energy
transition is thus much more than merely a technological shift; it is a
power strugogle and a socio-cultural change having a deep eﬀect on
incumbent institutions, routines, and beliefs.
While the analysis of Loorbach and Huﬀenreuter (2013) is in-
sightful, we believe their faith in TM oﬀering a solution is more wishful
thinking – by providing opportunities for transition pathways – than
backed up by evidence. Examples of community-based economic ac-
tivity and alternative currencies do not have enough traction on which
to base a revolution. In fact, they leave to future research the means to
bring this transformation about.
As with so much of the early writing on TM and SNM, the focus was
curiously on only inﬂuencing and destabilizing incumbents, rather than
replacing them, and government regulation was only vaguely discussed
in the context of creating an eﬀective and timely stimuli for change.
Later writing (for exmaple, see Kivimaa and Kern, 2016) departed from
this myopia and recognized the need of creating or propelling niches to
replace the incumbents using regulation but without emphasizing the
importance of mandatory targets that demand performance beyond
current capabilities.
5. Regulation-induced Innovation as an Alternative Pathway to
Achieving Sustainable Development
In a longer article the authors have argued that regulation – prop-
erly fashioned – can transform products and processes which confers
both economic and health, safety, and environmental beneﬁts as well as
costs (Ashford and Hall, 2011). In contrast, classical economic analysis
of the relationship between health, safety, and environmental regula-
tion and competitiveness maintains that stringent regulation increases
production costs, diverts resources from R&D, and consequently hinders
innovation. This assumption was challenged ﬁrst in the late 1970s at
MIT and made popular in 1991 by the so-called ‘Porter hypothesis’
(Porter, 1991; Porter and van den Linde, 1995).
The Porter hypothesis and the relevant literature indicate that en-
vironmental, health, and safety regulation can induce dramatic in-
novations, not only by spurring the development of new products or
services by incumbent producers, but also by creating conditions in
which new producers can enter the ﬁeld. Regulation can do this when
ﬁrms have, or are induced to have, the willingness, opportunity, and
capacity to innovate (Ashford and Hall, 2011, 2018). This literature,
and the insights gleaned from it, provides an important set of clues for
how regulation can be used to foster sustainability.
Based upon his research into the competitive advantage of nations,
Porter (1991, p. 168) claimed that “[s]trict environmental regulations
do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against foreign rivals;
indeed, they often enhance it. Tough standards trigger innovation and
upgrading.” He observes, “[p]roperly constructed regulatory standards,
which aim at outcomes and not methods, will encourage companies to
re-engineer their technology. The result in many cases is a process that
not only pollutes less but lowers costs or improves quality. […] Strict
product regulations can also prod companies into innovating to produce
less polluting or more resource-eﬃcient products that will be highly
valued internationally” (Porter, 1991). Porter's hypothesis is that [in-
cumbent] ﬁrms which respond to stringent regulation by developing
new technologies have a ‘ﬁrst mover’ advantage and can capture the
market for their products/services. Comparison of national competi-
tiveness with good environmental governance and private sector
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responsiveness supports the Porter hypothesis. Good economic man-
agement and good environmental management are related and ﬁrms
which succeed in developing innovative responses to environmental
challenges beneﬁt both environmentally and economically.
Earlier empirically based work on this concept, dates back twelve
years before Porter's work to research undertaken at MIT (Ashford,
1993; Ashford et al., 1985; Ashford and Heaton, 1983; Ashford et al.,
1979). This earlier work showed how stringent and focused regulations
in the U.S. chemical producing and using industries had the eﬀect of
stimulating fundamental product and process innovations. The MIT
studies revealed that environmental and health and safety regulation – if
appropriately designed, implemented, and complemented by economic
incentives – can lead to radical technological developments that can
signiﬁcantly reduce exposure to toxic chemicals in the natural and
working environments, and in consumer products.
A limitation of Porter's hypothesis is that it focuses on how incum-
bent ﬁrms respond to more stringent regulations, but it ignores the
important dynamics of new entrants (van de Poel, 2000). Porter and van
den Linde (1995) argue that regulation, properly designed, can cause a
regulated ﬁrm to undertake innovations that not only reduce pollution
– which is a hallmark of production ineﬃciency – but also save on
materials, water, and energy costs, conferring what Porter calls ‘in-
novation oﬀsets’ to the innovating ﬁrm (and what Ashford and his MIT
colleagues called ‘ancillary beneﬁts’). This can occur because the ﬁrm,
at any point in time, is sub-optimal. If the ﬁrm is the ﬁrst to comply
with regulation in an intelligent way, other ﬁrms will later have to rush
to comply and do so in a less thoughtful and more expensive way. Thus,
there are ‘learning curve’ advantages to being ﬁrst and early.
Given Porter's focus on ‘innovation oﬀsets’ – i.e., the cost savings
due to induced innovation that could exceed the cost of the regulation
(Porter and van den Linde, 1995) – he is mainly concerned with the
costs to incumbent ﬁrms. However, it is possible to diﬀerentiate between
‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of the regulation-induced innovation hy-
pothesis – a distinction that Porter does not make. In its weak form, as
Porter observes, ﬁrms subject to more stringent regulation respond with
product and process innovations. However, while environmental and
worker health and safety improvements may be realized, the oﬀending
products and processes may only be incrementally changed.
In contrast, in the strong form of the regulation-induced innovation
hypothesis, stringent regulation can stimulate the entrance of entirely
new products and processes into the market, thereby displacing domi-
nant technologies. In this situation, unless incumbent ﬁrms have both
the willingness and the capability to produce and compete with the new
forms of technology, they too are likely to be displaced from the market
(Christensen, 1997). Fig. 3 below provides a simple diagram of the
likely technological responses to the strong and weak forms of the
regulation-induced innovation hypothesis. Empirically-based examples
were researched by Ashford and his colleagues in their work.
While some question whether environmental regulation does gen-
erate a positive eﬀect on innovation (Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997; Robinson,
1995; Walley and Whitehead, 1994), their analyses tends to miss the
essence of the ‘strong’ form of the regulation-induced innovation hy-
pothesis. Although it is likely that stringent regulation will not stimu-
late technological innovation in most ﬁrms, some ﬁrms are likely to rise
to the challenge and become technological leaders in the process.
Hence, the “evidence is necessarily anecdotal” (Ashford, 1999, p. 3).
The Schumpeterian notion of ‘waves of creative destruction’ leading to
succeeding advances in technological development describes the pro-
cess by which dominant technologies are being continually displaced as
new technologies become available.
The design challenge facing government is how existing undesirable
technologies can be retired (or displaced) through a combination of
regulation and market incentives. These ideas thus challenge the notion
that incumbent ﬁrms will reinvent themselves in a signiﬁcant way and
should have a major role in setting the targets for future regulation.
Incumbents will not set targets they do not expect that they can meet.
With regard to the ‘weak’ form of the regulation-induced innovation
hypothesis, ambitious environmental policies in developed nations can
lead to the formation of ‘lead markets’ for environmental technologies
(Jänicke and Jacob, 2005). However, the evidence suggests that “the
international diﬀusion of environmental innovations must be accom-
panied by international policy diﬀusion, or the adoption by other
countries of the induced innovation must be economically reasonable”
(Beise et al., 2003, p. 1). Both of these factors make it diﬃcult to predict
with certainty whether an ambitious environmental policy is likely to
create a lead market for the international diﬀusion of innovations. The
uncertainty surrounding the likely impacts on national industries of
more stringent environmental [and health and safety] regulation is seen
as one reason why governments hesitate to implement such policies
(Blazejczak and Edler, 2004).
Stringent regulation can stimulate new entrants to introduce entirely
new products and processes into the market – products and processes that
will displace dominant technologies. One of several vivid examples is
the displacement of Monsanto's PCBs in transformers and capacitors by
an entirely diﬀerent dielectric ﬂuid pioneered by Dow Silicone.
Regulation can thus encourage disrupting innovations by giving more
inﬂuence to new customer bases, in which demands for improvements
in both environmental quality and energy use and eﬃciency are more
sharply deﬁned and articulated. Of course, industries that would fear
being displaced by new entrants would not be expected to welcome this
regulation. This explains in part their resistance to regulation and their
propensity to try to capture regulatory regimes, surreptitiously or
through direct negotiation with government (Caldart and Ashford,
1999). For a later discussion of resistance from incumbents see Geels
(2014) and Hess (2014).
In principle, regulation can be an eﬀective and proper instrument
for government to guide the innovation process. Well-designed reg-
ulation that sets new rules changes the institutional framework of the
market. It can thus be an important element in creating favorable
conditions for innovation that will enhance environmental
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Fig. 3. A model for regulation-induced technological change for ‘weak’ (Porter) and ‘strong’ (Ashford/MIT) forms of the regulation-induced innovation hypothesis.
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sustainability and create incentives for the development of powerful
lead-markets, which pull innovation towards sustainability (Jänicke
and Jacob, 2004). With regard to regulation, what seems to matter is
not only the stringency, mode (speciﬁcation versus performance stan-
dards), timing, uncertainty, focus (inputs versus product versus process)
of the regulation, and the existence of complementary economic in-
centives, but also the inherent innovativeness (usually in new entrants)
or lack of it (usually in the regulated ﬁrms) that the regulation en-
genders.
In order for innovation to occur, the ﬁrm (or government itself)
must have the willingness, opportunity/motivation, and capability/capacity
to innovate (Ashford, 2000; Ashford and Hall, 2018). These three fac-
tors aﬀect each other, of course; but each is determined by more fun-
damental factors.
Willingness is determined by (1) attitudes towards changes in pro-
duction in general, (2) an understanding of the problem, (3) knowledge
of possible options and solutions, and (4) the ability to evaluate alter-
natives. Improving (3) involves aspects of capacity building through the
diﬀusion of information, through trade associations, government-
sponsored education programs, inter-ﬁrm contacts, and the like.
Changing attitudes towards changes in production (1) often depends on
the attitudes of managers and on the larger culture and structure of the
organization, which may either stiﬂe or encourage innovation and risk
taking. Factors (2) and (4) depend on internal intellectual or knowl-
edge-based capacities. In the context of disrupting innovation by ﬁrms
representing the dominant technology, willingness is also shaped by the
[rare] commitment of management to nurture new approaches that are
at odds with its traditional value network or customer base.
Opportunity and motivation involve both supply-side and demand-
side factors. On the supply side, technological gaps can exist between
the technology currently used in a particular ﬁrm and the already-
available technology that could be adopted or adapted (known as dif-
fusion or incremental innovation, respectively), or alternatively the
technology that could be developed (i.e., signiﬁcant sustaining or dis-
rupting innovation). Consciousness of these gaps can prompt ﬁrms to
change their technology, as can the opportunity for cost savings.
Regulatory requirements can also deﬁne the changes that would be
necessary to remain in the market. On the demand side, three factors
could push ﬁrms towards technological change. These are (1) reg-
ulatory requirements, (2) public demand for more environmentally-
sound, eco-eﬃcient, and safer industry, products, and services, and (3)
worker demands and pressures arising from industrial relations con-
cerns. The ﬁrst factor could result from changes in the customer value
networks. However, all these factors may stimulate change too late in
the dominant technology ﬁrms, if new entrants have already seized the
opportunity to engage in developing disrupting innovations.
Capability or capacity may actually be the most important and lim-
iting factor and can be enhanced by (1) an understanding of the pro-
blem, (2) knowledge of possible options and solutions, (3) the ability to
evaluate alternatives, (4) resident/available skills and capabilities to
innovate, and (5) access to, and interaction with, outsiders. Knowledge
enhancement/learning (2) can be facilitated through deliberate or
serendipitous transfer of knowledge from suppliers, customers, trade
associations, unions, workers, and other ﬁrms, and the available lit-
erature. The skill base of the ﬁrm (4) can be enhanced through edu-
cating and training operators, workers, and managers, on both a formal
and informal basis, and by deliberate creation of networks and strategic
alliances not necessarily conﬁned to a geographical area, nation, or
technological regime.
Interaction with outsiders can stimulate more radical and disrupting
changes. This last method of enhancing the capacity of ﬁrms to un-
dertake technological change involves new ‘outsider’ ﬁrms and stake-
holders with which the ﬁrm has not traditionally been involved.
Capacity to change may also be inﬂuenced by the innovativeness (or
lack thereof) of the ﬁrm as determined by the maturity and technolo-
gical rigidity of a particular product or production line (Ashford, 2000;
Ashford et al., 1985). Some ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to innovate than others.
The heavy, basic industries, which are also sometimes the most pol-
luting, unsafe, and resource-intensive industries, change with great
diﬃculty, especially when it comes to core processes. New industries,
such as computer manufacturing, can also be polluting, unsafe (for
workers), and resource and energy intensive, although they may ﬁnd it
easier to meet environmental demands. Government should not miss
the opportunity to loosen the creative forces that bring about in-
novative changes that can simultaneously beneﬁt the economy, the
environment, and the general welfare.
6. The Importance of Diﬀusion in Achieving Sustainable
Development
Although technological innovation is crucial to achieve long-term
sustainable development and fosters adaptive transformations, the
preoccupation of scholars with innovation, in contrast with diﬀusion,
may contribute to under-deployment or lack of development of policies
that promote diﬀusion. The diﬀusion of technology is essential for en-
hancing sectoral and national revenues, as well as promoting more
sustainable industrial, agricultural, transportation, and construction
practices. There are many existing technologies that could contribute to
the reduction of health, safety, and environmental problems and im-
prove labor productiveness, but they either encroach on vested interests
in maintaining current practices or may impose costs on ﬁrms, on
consumers, or on both. In many cases, “environmental technologies”
are process technologies rather than products and may confer pro-
prietary beneﬁts on their designers, who may not want others to have
them. Environmental technologies are also diﬃcult to organize into a
market.
The slow pace of widespread technology adoption (diﬀusion) that
could contribute signiﬁcantly to more sustainable industrial systems is
not due to the fact that the “discovery” of solutions to health, safety,
and environmental challenges is lacking, nor is there a need for slow co-
evolutionary approaches. Rather, what is missing is political and pri-
vate-sector will for technology adoption. This may be as true for cleaner
technologies as for so-called end-of-pipe technologies. After all, if the
health, safety, and environmental harms that come from a technology
are not internalized in the price of a manufacturer's activities, products,
or services, why should they care if it is “cleaner”? Technology-diﬀu-
sion forcing by government supported by signiﬁcant demand by con-
sumers, citizens, or workers through the tools of regulation, taxes,
legislation, and stakeholder participation is likely to speed up the pace
of change towards sustainable development. In summary, government
needs to play a strong role in stimulating both radical disrupting in-
novation and the diﬀusion of technology. Otherwise, SNM and TM by
themselves are likely to be too little and too late.
The challenges of market failure and lock-in particularly apply to
radical systemic changes, which require changes in the institutional
environment and long periods of sustained policy support (Kemp, 1994;
Foxon and Pearson, 2007; McDowell and Ekins, 2014). Developing
countries face the additional challenges of more limited resources (ﬁ-
nancial, institutional, skill, etc.) and fewer experiences with state-
driven technology development and phase-in. While lock-in eﬀects may
be weaker in some cases where hardly any technologies exist yet,
market failures may be more pronounced in others due to stronger in-
formation asymmetries and cost barriers (Kemp and Never, 2017).
The promotion of a green industrial policy for developing countries
was explored by Kemp and Never (2017). The lock-in to unsustainable
technologies and resistance to change on the part of incumbents was
underscored. The authors observe that “challenges of market failures
and lock-in particularly apply to radical system changes, which require
changes in the institutional environment and long periods of sustained
policy support” (Kemp and Never, 2017, p. 67). What is revealing about
this conclusion is that no mention is made of discontinuous, radical
change that might be exacted on the application of stringent regulation.
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Instead, what the authors are describing is the slow process of evolu-
tionary change that delivers needed change with great diﬃculty.
Though a recent paper, the authors rely on the older literature on
transition management to explain the recommended approaches in the
context of developing countries. Since developing countries are not
likely to have mature regulatory systems, and certainly are not wedded
to technology-forcing that stringent regulation can elicit, the authors
may well be correct in investing their faith instead in transition man-
agement. This begs the question of whether some developed economies
who are reluctant to adopt stringent technology-forcing regulatory
approaches will utilize evolutionary or co-evolutionary strategies to
achieve more sustainable development in a timely manner. If not, this
does not bode well for the needed progress. The Paris Agreement on
Global Climate Change, while eliciting voluntary commitments from its
many signatories, is premised on the belief that suﬃcient pressure for
rapid enough change has been created and changes will emerge soon
enough. This remains to be seen.
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